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III.Abstract
In this paper we investigate the coherence between bank ratings and default
probability in emerging market economies using scoring and mapping tech-
niques. In order to achieve its disciplining role, the rating should be coherent
with the default risk it summarizes and disseminate. This issue is particu-
larly crucial in emerging economies where under-developed ﬁnancial markets,
banking sector accrued opacity, and inadequate regulatory, institutional and
legal environment aﬀect banker’s risk taking behavior and bank’s default risk.
Scoring results show a correct quantiﬁcation of agency rating grades and thus
their coherence. Mapping results show a tendency of the rating to aggregate
bank’s default risk information into intermediate low category grades.
Key words : emerging market economies, default probability, bank rat-
ing, scoring and mapping methods.
JEL classiﬁcation : C35, F39, G21.1 Introduction
Ratings are considered as an important indicator of issuer’s default risk by
many economic agents, like regulators and investors. A strong consensus
exists, considering ratings as a crucial vector of information, superior to the
information available on the ﬁnancial markets (see for example Hand et al.
1992, Reitert and Zeibert 1991 and Ederington et al. 1987).
In the Third Pillar of the Basel II Reform framework, an important role
is provided to agency ratings. They give a signal on counterparty’s default
probability to other market participants and economic agents. This type of
information should contribute to the eﬃciency of market discipline. It is
especially important in emerging market economies, where under-developed
ﬁnancial markets, banking sector accrued opacity, and inadequate regula-
tory, institutional and legal environment may create adverse incentives to
take excessive risks by banks and therefore increase their default probability
(Rojas-Suarez 2000, Rojas-Suarez 2001). An eﬃcient market discipline is
needed in order to counterbalance such incentives.
The coherence of the agency rating with the default probability is then
crucial within such framework, because it can foster incentives to adopt a
conservative risk taking behavior in banks. If the rating is coherent with
the default risk which it summarizes in a notation, it gives a viable signal
about bank strength, and may therefore enhance the market’s transparency
and fosters market discipline. Thus, the bank is incited to adopt a conser-
vative risk taking behavior because excess risk impacts positively its default
probability, inducing a rating downgrade, and a negative signal to the mar-
ket and the regulator. The agency rating can also be used as a supervisory
tool, giving the regulator an additional signal about bank fragility. Using
such signal improves the assessment of on-site examination and regulatory
actions against unhealthy banks, in order to build a regulatory discipline,
which should also aﬀect excess risk taking incentives in banks.
An important literature deals with issues such as rating and rating predic-
tion models (see Beaver 1966, Pinches and Mingo 1975, Kaplan and Urwitz
1979, Fons and Kimball 1991), as well as Ederington et al. (1987), and
1Brister et al. (1994), as well as comparative studies of diﬀerent agency
ratings (see Cantor and Packer 1995, Cantor and Packer 1996, Jewell and
Livingston 1999, Shin and Moore 2003). Few studies deal with the coherence
of ratings with bank’s default probabilities in emerging market economies1.
Therefore, the aim of this article is to investigate the coherence between
Moody’s ratings and the default probabilities from a simple scoring model
applied to banks from emerging market economies. The scoring and mapping
methodology of Carey and Hrycay (2001) is adopted. Further investigation
into bank rating determinants is also presented.
The article is organized as follows. A brief description of bank’s default
and rating systems is proposed in section 2. Section 3 describes the method-
ology and the data used in the study. The results are discussed in section 4.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Bank’s default and rating systems in emerg-
ing market economies
The interest for bank failures comes mainly from its costs : ﬁnancial losses
for the stakeholders (shareholders, clients, deposits insurance fund), loss of
competition, and a potential destabilization of the ﬁnancial system, through
contagion mechanisms, several individual failures leading to a banking crisis.
The resolution of these failures is a waste of resources, particularly scarce in
emerging market economies (EME) (Honohan 1997)2.
An important literature deals with the explanation and prediction of
bank’s default, using econometric models which usually follow a CAMEL
typology for selecting proxies of risk factors inﬂuencing bank’s default risk
(see Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt 1989). Agency rating can be understood as a signal
summarizing information about bank’s default probability. One of the aim
1Except Kr¨ amer and G¨ uttler (2003) and G¨ uttler (2004), who compare the rating’s
default prediction accuracy using notations from S&P and Moody’s for samples with all
type of issuer and geographic area.
2For example, the banking crisis in Indonesia (1997) and Thailand (1997-98) costed
about 50-55% and 42.3% of the GDP respectively in term of restructurization (ﬁscal con-
tribution).
2of a rating is to disseminate information about the issuer’s capacity to re-
imburse its debt. Therefore, the rating gives a synthetic indicator of default
risk of this issuer.
Following Crouhy et al. (2001), a rating system is based on quantitative
and qualitative evaluation of default risk. The ﬁnal decision concerning the
rating is done on general considerations, as well as subjective judgment of the
analyst. Financial documents, management quality, competition, macroe-
conomic and sector fundamentals contribute to the rating process. These
ratings correspond to a classiﬁcation of the issuers or issues in grades which
reﬂect expected losses.
Following Ferri et al. (1999), the rating agencies play an important role in
ﬁnancial markets, through the production of information and its dissemina-
tion to market participants. This is supposed to enhance market discipline.
The rating grade is a crucial determinant of the issue’s interest rate as well
as the number of potential investors.
In emerging market economies, the rating is even more important because
of less developed ﬁnancial markets, usually more opaque, with a weak market
discipline. This under-development of ﬁnancial markets, an opaque banking
sector, and an inadequate regulatory, institutional and legal environment are
some of the emerging markets’ speciﬁc features which may give the rating
a crucial role in investor’s but also regulator’s decision making. The weight
given to the rating in an investor’s decision is even greater. In such a frame-
work, the rating plays a “guiding” role. Concerning banking industry, the
rating’s availability gives a better transparency of bank’s health. Banks play
a crucial role in the economic development process in emerging countries. In
such framework, the rating may foster market discipline through viable and
precise information’s dissemination, inﬂuencing bank’s risk taking behavior.
The rating can also be useful for supervisory purposes, enhancing regulatory
discipline, and also aﬀecting bank’s risk taking. Therefore, the role of the rat-
ing as a vector of information in these countries shouldn’t be underestimated,
and their coherence with default risk should be investigated.
Moody’s Investors Service has launched in 1995 a new type of bank’s
rating : the Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Rating (MBFSR). MBFSR
3corresponds to Moody’s opinion on the internal ﬁnancial strength of a bank.
The determinants of this new rating are diﬀerent from traditional ratings
(like debt, credit, bank deposits, syndicate loans ratings, ...). MBFSR is
available for banks from 50 countries. The grades range from A (best rating)
to E (worst rating). MBFSR is the outcome of a ﬁnancial analysis and a
subjective judgment of the analyst. It is available on a solicited and unso-
licited basis. Poon et al. (1999) have studied the MBFSR determinants.
Their results show that this rating doesn’t have a high supplementary infor-
mational contribution, when compared to other Moody’s traditional ratings.
The MBFSR can be understood as a synthetic indicator of bank’s default
probability, as it aims at summarizing information about bank’s ﬁnancial
strength.
The Fitch IBCA, Duﬀ & Phelps agency is specialized in banks’ rating,
via its company - Fitch Ratings. It produces only solicited ratings, contrary
to Moody’s. The Fitch Individual Rating (FIR) evaluates the bank’s risk
exposure, risk appetite and risk management capabilities. It ranges from
A (best rating) to E (worst rating). It represents Fitch’s opinion on the
probability that the bank would require external support. Factors like prof-
itability, accounting integrity, charter value, management’s quality, operating
environment, ... are taken into account during the rating process.
3 Methodology and data
3.1 Methodology
We adopt the scoring and mapping methodology from Carey and Hrycay
(2001). We apply a logit model to estimate default probabilities. Then, we
use their distribution to build simulated rating grades, and confront them
to agency rating grades and their historical default probabilities. The esti-
mation of the default probability allows to quantify the ratings grades (both
the simulated and the agency ones) and to evaluate their coherence. The
mapping of the simulated ratings into the agency ratings allows to deepen
the ratings coherence investigation. Through this method we can also test
4the possibility of using such approach for building internal rating systems to
manage interbank risk exposure.
This methodology allows to formally link“real”default probabilities, pre-
dicted default probabilities and the quantiﬁed default probabilities.
We suppose that each issuer i is characterized at time t by its distance
to default Dit and the volatility of this distance Vit. In t, the (unobserved)
default probability at a time horizon of n years, noted Pnit, is the probability
that Dit falls to 0 during the time interval [t,t + n].
The aim of a rating system is to measure the default risk at a time horizon
of n years through the aggregation of information about D and V into an
estimation of the default probability P r
nit = f(Dit,Vit). The rating gives a
scale which speciﬁes the grade Gnit associated to each value of P r
nit. Under
the hypothesis that P r
nit measures Pnit, each issuer in the same grade have
Pnit which values are within the interval of default probabilities determining
the rating grade. The rating process involves subjective human judgement.
Therefore, P r
nit is a latent variable. The quantiﬁcation of the mean default




The quantiﬁcation of the rating grade can be obtained using scoring mod-
els. The mapping methods use the median issuer or the mean weighted de-
fault rate. These methods decompose into two steps. First, it equalizes
each internal rating grade to an external rating grade. Second, it uses the
mean default rate corresponding to the median external rating grade as an
estimator of the mean default probability of the internal rating grade3.
In this article, we apply this methodology in order to investigate the
coherence of agency bank’s ratings (Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Rating
MBFSR and Fitch Individual Rating FIR) with bank’s default risk.
To summarize, we proceed in 4 steps :
1. we apply a logit model as the scoring model in order to estimate indi-
vidual default probabilities. The scoring function is deﬁned as a logit
3The subjective mapping (through human judgment) is quite diﬃcult to apply, as
internal rating systems are deﬁned on often subjective criteria. The mechanical mapping is







= α + Y
′
i β + εi,
with p(DEFAULT) =
expW
1+expW , W = α + Y ′
i β + εi, Y ′
i = risk factors,
the residuals εi having a logistic distribution4, noted ˆ pD,
2. using the distribution of the default probabilities ˆ pD, we build simu-
lated rating systems, following Moody’s reports (Hamilton et al. 2004),
in order to obtain an ordinal scale of rating grades corresponding to dif-
ferent default risks,
3. we calculate the following descriptive statistics : means and medians of
estimated probabilities ˆ pD, as well as observed default rate frequencies,
by simulated and agency (Moody’s and Fitch) rating grades,
4. we confront the simulated rating grades to agency rating grades in order
to proceed to the mapping, using historical default rates of Moody’s
and Fitch ratings.
3.2 Data
We use data extracted from the Bankscope (2003) database, containing ac-
counting data on banks from emerging market economies for the period from
1998 to 2002, including default banks5, and the Moody’s (Bank Financial
Strength Ratings) and Fitch (Fitch Individual Ratings) ratings. After hav-
ing bound and cleaned the data, we obtain two samples of 483 and 257 banks
for Moody’s and Fitch respectively, covering emerging market economies from
4See Maddala (1983) for a detailed description of logit models.
5A default banks database has been build for emerging market countries from the three
areas of South-East Asia, South America and Central and Eastern Europe. In order to
get information about default banks, we have contacted local regulatory and supervisory
institutions. We have also used information from the on-line database Banker’s Almanac.
The database allows to identify the name of the default bank and the time of default. A
bank is considered as default when it’s under one of the following procedure : external
administration (regulatory and restructuring agency support), banking licence suspension
or revocation, liquidation, failure.
6South-East Asia, South America and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 68
and 48 defaults are present in both samples6.
The deﬁnitions of the Moody’s and Fitch ratings are given in the tables
hereafter.
Table 1: Deﬁnition and frequencies of the Moody’s Bank Financial Strength
Rating
MBFSR Observations Deﬁnition
A 0 Exceptional intrinsic ﬁnancial strength.
Major institutions with highly valuable
franchise value, strong ﬁnancial fundamentals,
and a very attractive and stable operating environment.
B 12 Strong intrinsic ﬁnancial strength.
Important institutions, with valuable franchise value,
sound ﬁnancial fundamentals and stable
operating environment.
C 57 Good intrinsic ﬁnancial strength.
Valuable franchise value, acceptable ﬁnancial
fundamentals within a stable operating environment,
or above average ﬁnancial fundamentals within an
unstable operating environment.
D 237 Weak intrinsic ﬁnancial strength.
Weak franchise value, ﬁnancial fundamentals and an
unstable operating environment.
E 177 Very weak intrinsic ﬁnancial strength. Periodical
external support is necessary. Doubtful franchise value,
deﬁcient ﬁnancial fundamentals, and a highly
unstable operating environment.
Source : Moody’s Investors Service, Global Credit Research, and Poon et al. (1999).
We use the logit model as a scoring model to estimate default probabili-
ties, which distribution serves as a support for building the simulated rating
scale. The logistic function is particularly suitable in this framework, as the
estimated probabilities are within the [0,1] interval.
6See table 15 and 16 in appendix for the countries in our 2 samples.
7Table 2: Deﬁnition and frequencies of the Fitch Individual Rating
FIR Frequency Deﬁnition
A 4 Very strong bank.
Characterized by excellent proﬁtability, accounting
integrity, charter value, management quality,
operating environment, and perspectives.
B 37 Strong bank, without major problems.
Characterized by a good proﬁtability and accounting
integrity, an important charter value,
sound management, and a stable operating
environment and good perspectives.
C 84 Adequate bank, with problems concerning
proﬁtability and accounting integrity, charter value,
management quality, operating environment
or perspectives.
D 101 Bank having internal and/or external fragilities.
Proﬁtability, accounting integrity, charter value,
management, operating environment or perspectives
are problematic.
E 31 Bank having serious problems, implying external support.
Source : Fitch IBCA, Duﬀ & Phelps, FitchRatings.
We use this distribution to build a rating grades scale, as shown in table
3.
We also build a simulated rating containing 4 grades for the MBFSR, as
we don’t have any A MBFSR in our sample7. We aggregate the ﬁrst two
grades from the scale 5 simulated rating system, in order to obtain a 4 rating
grades scale, as shown in table 4.
7Poon et al. (1999) has only 4% of A’s in their sample, as this rating grade is given
only to bank with exceptional internal ﬁnancial strength. Such strength is hardly found
in banks from emerging market economies.
8Table 3: Five grades simulated rating system







Table 4: Four grades simulated rating system






4 Results and discussion
Our aim is not to build the most performant default model, that is why we
use a logit model containing 6 explanatory variables, proxies of the principal
risk factors found in the literature (see Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt 1989), which have sig-
niﬁcant impact on bank default probability. These factors follow a CAMEL
typology, with the dimensions of capital adequacy with respect to the loan
portfolio (EQTL = Equity / Total Loans), bank management (PXTOX =
Personal Expenses / Total Operating Expenses), proﬁtability (NIM = Net
Interest Margin), liquidity (LIQATA = Liquid Assets / Total Assets and
TDTA = Total Deposits / Total Assets), and portfolio quality (LLRNPL =
Loan Loss Reserves / Non Performing Loans).
In the two following subsections, we ﬁrst show the results for the MBFSR
sample in subsection 4.1, then for the FIR sample in subsection 4.2.













R2 Mc Fadden 47.15
Hosmer & Lemeshow 179.26∗∗∗
Def. reclas. rate 86.8
coef. : estimated coeﬃcient, s.e. : standard-error.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ : signiﬁcant coef. at 1%, 5% and 10%.
Ndef.: number of defaults, N : number of banks.
LogL : logarithm of the likelihood.
LR : likelihood ratio.
Def. reclas. rate : default reclassiﬁcation rate.
4.1 Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Rating results
We present in table 5 the results of the bank default logit model for the
MBFSR sample.
The signiﬁcant coeﬃcients have expected signs for the variables : EQTL,
NIM, LIQATA, TDTA and LLRNPL. A better capital adequacy, a good
interest margin, more deposits and liquid assets and a better cover of NPL
with reserves reduce bank default probability. The statistics of the model
are satisfactory (signiﬁcant LR, good adjustment quality and a good default
reclassiﬁcation rate, above 85%).
We use the distribution of the estimated bank default probabilities to
10build the simulated rating system, by dividing the interval in 5 and 4 grades8.
The division in 5 rating grades serves as a benchmark, the division in 4 rating
grades is done due to data availability, as we have only 4 MBFSR grades in
our sample : B, C, D et E. Using the mean and median estimated default
probabilities, we can quantify each simulated rating grade, and compare them
to the observed default rate by simulated grade.
In what follows, we use the following abbreviations : med. - median, low.
and up. CI lim. - respectively lower and upper conﬁdence interval limits
at the 95% level, def. rate - observed default rate, and N def. - number of
defaults. We note the estimated default probability as ˆ pD. The mean and
median values of ˆ pD are obtained using the bank default logit model. The
values of def. rate are the proportion of defaults in the sample of the banks
by each grade. Finally, the lower and upper CI. limits at the 95% are for the
observed default rate, by grade. The results are shown in table 6.
Table 6: Means and medians of the estimated default probability and default
rate by simulated rating grade - MBFSR sample
scale (5) mean ˆ pD med. ˆ pD def. N def. low. CI. up. CI.
rate lim. lim.
1 0.000155 0.000036 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
2 0.001692 0.001625 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
3 0.005957 0.005837 0.0549 5 0.0081 0.1018
4 0.02583 0.02437 0.011 1 0.0000 0.0324
5 0.376008 0.359755 0.3584 62 0.2869 0.4298
scale (4) mean ˆ pD med. ˆ pD def. N def. low. CI. up. CI.
rate lim. lim.
1 0.000454 0.00007 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
2 0.005957 0.005837 0.0549 5 0.0081 0.1018
3 0.02583 0.02437 0.011 1 0.0000 0.0324
4 0.376008 0.359755 0.3584 62 0.2869 0.4298
These ﬁrst results show that, for the scale 5, the mean estimated default
8The number of observations by simulated rating grades are (decreasing with the rating)
: 103, 25, 91, 91, 173 for the scale 5 rating grades and 128, 91, 91, 173 for the scale 4
rating grades.
11probability under-estimates the observed default rate, except for grade 5 -
the most risky. The means and medians of the estimated default probability
are close for every grade, except grade 1. As the number of default are null
for the low risk grades 1 and 2, there are important diﬀerences between the
estimated default probability and observed default rate. For each grade, the
mean of the estimated default probability is within the limits of the CI at
the 95% level, except for grade 3.
The conclusions are similar for the scale 4, despite the fact of aggregating
the lowest risk grades, which reduces the number of grades without observed
defaults. The mean estimated default probability is close to the observed
default rate only for the last grade 4 - the most risky. The means and
medians of the estimated default probability are also close. Finally, for each
grade, the mean ˆ pD is within the CI limits at the 95% level, except for grade
3.
We show the same descriptive statistics (mean and median estimated
default probability, observed default rate and CI limits at the 95% level) by
MBFSR grade in table 7.
Table 7: Means and medians of the estimated default probability and default
rate by MBFSR grade
MBFSR (4) mean ˆ pD med. ˆ pD def. N def. low. CI. up. CI.
rate lim. lim.
B 0.013101 0.011086 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
C 0.033047 0.003466 0.0351 2 0.0000 0.0829
D 0.07714 0.007155 0.0844 20 0.049 0.1198
E 0.269362 0.14728 0.2599 46 0.1953 0.3245
It is important to notice that the rating is by nature through the cycle, but
the logit model estimates a point in time default probability. If the default
model can correctly estimate individual default probabilities at a horizon of
one year, it should also allow to estimate correctly mean default probability
by MBFSR grade9.
9Of course, the discriminatory power of the logit model is imperfect.
12The results in table 7 show that the mean estimated default probabilities
are close to the observed default rates for the riskiest grades - C, D and
E. For grade B, the model over-estimates the eﬀective default risk, as no
default is observed for this grade in our sample. The means and medians of
the estimated default probability are far away one from another, except for
grade B. The mean estimated default probabilities are within the CI limits
at the 95% level for each grade.
Finally, we use the default probability (one year transition to the default
grade) of the Moody’s rating grades in order to map the simulated rating
system into the agency rating system. The results are shown in table 8. New
abbreviations are the following : hist. def. rate - historical default rate,
and mean weigth. hist. ˆ pD - mean weighted historical estimated default
probability. Historical default rates correspond to the historical transition
rates to the DEFAULT category of bank’s ratings at one year horizon during
the period 1970-2002 for the emerging market economies10. The weighted
mean estimated default probability is calculated as follows :




Ng being the number of observations by each simulated grade, and N the
total number of observations in the sample.
Following the results shown in table 8 for the scale 5, the ﬁrst 4 simu-
lated grades correspond to a median D Moody’s rating, which “aggregate”
default information of the 4 simulated grades into an intermediary low cat-
egory agency rating11. The last simulated grade 5 corresponds to a me-
dian E Moody’s rating. The corresponding historical default rates under-
estimate the default risk compared to observed default frequencies. The
mean weighted historical ˆ pD under-estimate even more the observed default
rates. The conclusions are similar for scale 4. Thus, the use of this map-
10We use the transition matrix including withdrawn ratings, supposing the following
relationship between the Moody’s credit ratings and MBFSR (the speculative grade begins
at the Baa rating for Moody’s) : Aaa = A, Aa = B, A = C, Baa-B=D, Caa-C = E. Source
: Credit Risk Calculator, Moody’s Investor Services.
11The importance of this category in our sample could play a role in this result.
13Table 8: Mapping of the simulated ratings into Moody’s ratings
scale med. hist. def. mean mean weight. def. low. CI up. CI
(5) MBFSR rate MBFSR hist. ˆ pD rate lim. lim
1 D 0.025 2.98 0.005331 0 0.0000 0.0000
2 D 0.025 3.04 0.001234 0 0.0000 0.0000
3 D 0.025 3.02 0.00471 0.0549 0.0081 0.1018
4 D 0.025 2.86 0.00471 0.011 0.0000 0.0324
5 E 0.125 3.62 0.044772 0.3584 0.2869 0.4298
scale med. hist. def. mean mean weight. def. low. CI up. CI
(4) MBFSR rate MBFSR hist. ˆ pD rate lim. lim
1 D 0.025 2.99 0.00629 0 0.0000 0.0000
2 D 0.025 3.02 0.00471 0.0549 0.0081 0.1018
3 D 0.025 2.86 0.00471 0.011 0.0000 0.0324
4 E 0.125 3.62 0.044772 0.3584 0.2869 0.4298
ping method would aggregate the default information into intermediate low
category agency rating12.
4.2 Fitch Individual Rating results
We present the results of the bank default logit model for the FIR sample in
table 9.
Following these results, most of the signiﬁcant coeﬃcients have expected
signs (EQTL, TDTA et LLRNPL). The model’s statistics are satisfactory
(signiﬁcant LR and good adjustment quality), as well as a satisfactory default
reclassiﬁcation rate, above 85%.
Using the distribution of the estimated default probability, we build a
simulated rating system, following the same rules as exposed in section 3.
Then, we proceed following the same 4 steps as for the MBFSR in subsection
4.1. The same abbreviations apply.
12An alternative division of the distribution of estimated default probabilities could alter
these results.













R2 Mc Fadden 49.56
Hosmer & Lemeshow 529.34∗∗∗
Def. reclas. rate 87.5
coef. : estimated coeﬃcient, s.e. : standard-error.
∗∗∗ : signiﬁcant coef. at 1%.
Ndef.: number of defaults, N : number of banks.
LogL : logarithm of the likelihood.
LR : likelihood ratio.
Def. reclas. rate : default reclassiﬁcation rate.
Following these results13, the mean estimated default probabilities by
simulated grade over-estimates the observed default rate, as we don’t have
any defaults for the best grades 1 and 2, and under-estimates the observed
default rate for the grade 3. The means and medians of the estimated default
probabilities are close. Only the mean estimated default probabilities for
grade 3 and 5 are within the CI limits of the 95% level.
We observe a homogeneity in the observed default rate’s repartition by
rating grades, with a number of observed default lower for the E grade com-
pared to the D grade. The mean estimated default probability are close to
the observed default rate, with an over-estimation for the A and D grades,
13The repartition of the banks per simulated grades is the following (decreasing with
the rating) : 44, 12, 36, 53, 112.
15Table 10: Means and medians of the estimated default probability and default
rate by simulated rating grade - FIR sample
scale (5) mean ˆ pD med. ˆ pD def. N def. low. CI. up. CI.
rate lim. lim.
1 0.000135 0.000035 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
2 0.001038 0.001554 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
3 0.005629 0.00563 0.0833 3 0.0000 0.1736
4 0.026473 0.024097 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
5 0.411889 0.434058 0.4018 45 0.311 0.4926
Table 11: Means and medians of the estimated default probability and default
rate by FIR grade
FIR (5) mean ˆ pD med. ˆ pD def. N def. low. CI. up. CI.
rate lim. lim.
A 0.013005 0.012224 0 0 0.0000 0.0000
B 0.027761 0.00715 0.0541 2 0.0000 0.1269
C 0.114728 0.004343 0.1548 13 0.0774 0.2321
D 0.245638 0.134073 0.2079 21 0.1288 0.2871
E 0.394766 0.444863 0.3871 12 0.2156 0.5586
and an under-estimation for the B grade. Except for the extreme risk grades
- A and E - the means and medians of the estimated default probabilities
are far away one from another. The mean estimated default probability are
within the CI limits at the 95% level.
The results of the mapping 14 are satisfactory for the ﬁrst 2 grades of
the simulated rating (the less risky). For the 3 other grades, the mapping
results are highly unsatisfactory, as the corresponding historical default rates
under-estimate the observed default rates.
14We apply the following correspondence between the FIR and the Fitch credit ratings,
using the transition matrix to the category DEFAULT at one year horizon, for the period
1990-2002 : AAA=A, AA=B, A=C, BBB-B=D, CCC-C=E. Source : FitchRatings.
16Table 12: Mapping of the simulated ratings into Fitch ratings
scale (5) med. hist. def. mean mean weight. def. low. CI up. CI
FIR rate FIR hist. ˆ pD rate lim. lim
1 B 0.0000 3 0.000086 0 0.0000 0.0000
2 B/C 0.0005a 2.83 0.000023 0 0.0000 0.0000
3 C 0.0005 3.06 0.00007 0.0833 0.0000 0.1736
4 C 0.0005 3.17 0.000103 0 0.0000 0.0000
5 D 0.0529 3.97 0.023054 0.4018 0.311 0.4926
a : The median Fitch rating being equal to 2.5, we use the historical default rate corresponding
to the rating C.
4.3 Further investigations into the ratings determinants
In order to deepen our inquiry, we investigate the determinants of the Moody’s
and Fitch ratings. In a ﬁrst step, we introduce the same variables used in
the scoring model in a bank’s rating ordered logit model. This allows us
to check if these variables are still signiﬁcant and keep the same signs. It
also allows us to test if they can discriminate correctly between the diﬀerent
ratings grades, by checking the signiﬁcancy of the intercepts in the ordered
logit.
The results are shown in tables 13 and 14 for the MBFSR and FIR re-
spectively15.
We ﬁrst comment the results for the MBFSR. Compared to the scoring
model (see table 5), the variable EQTL is no more signiﬁcant, whereas the
variable TDTA is signiﬁcant with a positive sign. The capital adequacy di-
mension seems to not have any inﬂuence on the Moody’s rating, but the
deposits to assets ratio have a positive impact on the cumulative probability
of having an E rating. Thus, the moral hazard hypothesis seems to be val-
idated in the MBFSR framework - the more a bank is risky and fragile on
the assets’ side, the more it requires deposits to fund herself (deposits being
15Recall that in the ordered logit framework we model the cumulative probability of
having the worst rating class - p(MBFSR=4) and p(FIR=5) respectively - corresponding
to the rating class E in both cases, for traceability with the default model.
17Table 13: MBFSR ordered logit results
coef. s.e.
INTERCEPT 4 0.718 0.575
INTERCEPT 3 3.564∗∗∗ 0.597










R2 Mc Fadden 11.77
Cor. reclas. rate 73.6
coef. : estimated coeﬃcient, s.e. : standard error.
∗∗∗ and ∗∗: signiﬁcant coef. at the 1% and 5% level.
N : number of banks.
LogL : logarithm of the likelihood.
LR : likelihood ratio.
Cor. reclas. rate : correct reclassiﬁcation rate.
one of the cheapest source of funds).
All of the intercepts are signiﬁcant, except INTERCEPT 4. It corre-
sponds to the MBFSR E grade - the worst quality rating. It seems that the
variables from the scoring model cannot correctly discriminate the Moody’s
rating grades, particularly the one corresponding to the least ﬁnancially
strong bank16.
The evidence is similar for the FIR ordered logit results. All variables
are signiﬁcant as in the scoring model (with the same signs, see table 9),
except for TDTA. All the intercepts are signiﬁcant, except INTERCEPT
16Notice that when we aggregate the MBFSR E and D classes, the ordered logit results
show that all intercepts are signiﬁcant. Therefore, the same risk factors used in the scoring
model are capable to discriminate correctly no more than 3 ﬁnancial strength rating grades
in our sample.
18Table 14: FIR ordered logit results
coef. s.e.
INTERCEPT 5 −1.198 0.889
INTERCEPT 4 1.181 0.892
INTERCEPT 3 3.193∗∗∗ 0.903










R2 Mc Fadden 10.51
Cor. reclas. rate 74.9
coef. : estimated coeﬃcient, s.e. : standard error.
∗∗∗ and ∗∗: signiﬁcant coef. at the 1% and 5% level.
N : number of banks.
LogL : logarithm of the likelihood.
LR : likelihood ratio.
Cor. reclas. rate : correct reclassiﬁcation rate.
5 and INTERCEPT 4, corresponding to the worst rating grades E and D.
Again, using the same risk factors as in the scoring model doesn’t allow to
correctly discriminate between the FIR grades, especially the worst ones17.
Following these results, other factors should be included in the rating’s
model in order to discriminate precisely each rating grade, especially the
worst. These results also indicate that the coherence between the rating and
the default probability could be aﬀected by the risk factors used in the scoring
model. Adding new variables (regulatory and institutional factors, macroe-
conomic and market structure factors, ...) might allow us to investigate this
17Notice also in this case that when we aggregate the FIR E and D grades, all the
intercepts are signiﬁcant in the ordered logit regression.
19issue more deeply18.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes an investigation of the coherence between agency rating
- Moody’s Bank Financial Strength Rating and Fitch Individual Rating -
with the results of a bank default logit model in emerging market economies.
In order to achieve this goal, we apply a scoring and mapping methodol-
ogy, following Carey and Hrycay (2001), to a sample of rated banks from
emerging market economies. The results show that by using a simple scoring
model, we were able to quantify the agency rating grades, and ﬁnd a satis-
factory coherence between these ratings and the observed bank default rates.
The mapping show a tendency of the agency ratings to aggregate default
information into intermediate low category ratings, with an insuﬃcient dis-
crimination of the bank’s default risk in these emerging market economies.
Thus, the use of these agency ratings to map an bank’s internal rating sys-
tem for interbank risk management would give unsatisfactory results, with
insuﬃcient discrimination and precision of the bank’s default risk.
By including regulatory and institutional factors into the scoring model,
we enhance its statistical quality, but the aggregation of the default informa-
tion into intermediate low quality grade remains. Notice that an alternative
division of the estimated default probability distribution could alter these
results. As we have seen for the rating model, other factors may need to
be included into the scoring model, particularly macroeconomic and market
structure.
18Testing several ratings models (including diﬀerent new additional variables) and their
intercepts signiﬁcancy, as well as comparing the resulting reclassiﬁcation tables is a work
in progress.
20APPENDIX
Appendix 1 Rated banks by country
Table 15: Frequencies of Moody’s BFSR rated banks by country
Country Code N. banks Frequency
Argentina AR 40 8.28
Brazil BR 52 10.77
Colombia CO 23 4.76
Czech Republic CZ 12 2.48
Ecuador EC 8 1.66
Hong Kong HK 6 1.24
Croatia HR 4 0.83
Indonesia ID 7 1.45
South Korea KR 60 12.42
Latvia LV 10 2.07
Mexico MX 33 6.83
Malaysia MY 20 4.14
Peru PE 23 4.76
Poland PL 46 9.52
Romania RO 12 2.48
Singapore SG 22 4.55
Slovenia SI 2 0.41
Slovakia SK 14 2.90
Thailand TH 47 9.73
Taiwan TW 6 1.24
Venezuela VE 36 7.45
483 100
21Table 16: Frequencies of Fitch IR rated banks by country
Country Code N. banks Frequency
Argentina AR 16 6.23
Brazil BR 26 10.12
Czech Republic CZ 7 2.72
Hong Kong HK 4 1.56
Croatia HR 4 1.56
Indonesia ID 4 1.56
South Korea KR 42 16.34
Latvia LV 4 1.56
Mexico MX 24 9.34
Malaysia MY 12 4.67
Peru PE 1 0.39
Poland PL 25 9.73
Singapore SG 15 5.84
Slovenia SI 1 0.39
Slovakia SK 2 0.78
Thailand TH 39 15.18
Taiwan TW 6 2.33
Venezuela VE 25 9.73
257 100
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